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Abstract: The goal of the ubiquitous connectivity is to enable 
mobile users to be permanently and transparently connected to the 
Internet. These mobile users are often connected via wireless 
networks like Wi-Fi or WiMax and consuming services that require 
a high Quality of Service (QoS) level such as video on demand or 
voice over IP. The wireless access to these services may make the 
concerned communications vulnerable to security attacks because 
of the open medium on which these access technologies are based. 
Hence, in ubiquitous environments, we need to guarantee both QoS 
and security for mobile users’ communications. In such an 
environment, it becomes very difficult for service providers to 
satisfy these users’ needs. A solution is to assign a profile to each 
user in order to optimize and automate the process of service level 
negotiation which enables guaranteeing QoS and security.  
In this paper, we present a protocol for service level negotiation 
which uses Web Services and includes both QoS and security in its 
negotiation. Then, we propose to adapt it to ubiquitous 
environments by basing its processing on the user profile and by 
specifying collaboration with the IEEE 802.21 standard, which 
manages the mobility of users and participates in the creation of 
theirs profiles. After that, we provide the negotiation flow of this 
protocol with security features using WSS, SSL and IPSec. Since, 
these security protocols may have an impact on the negotiation 
protocol performances; we will also evaluate this impact. Test 
results and implementation aspects are also shown in this paper. 
 
Keywords: quality of service, security, service level negotiation, 
ubiquitous environment, user profile.  
1. Introduction 
To provide ubiquitous Internet, mobile terminals such as 
laptops, PDAs and smart-phones are equipped with many 
connection interfaces and wireless networks are widely 
deployed. Thus, mobile users will be able to connect 
anytime, anywhere and using different technologies 
especially wireless ones. In this context, the need of security 
is very increasing. This security could be introduced at 
different levels by implementing security protocols such as: 
RADIUS, DIAMETER, SSL/TLS, DTLS, IPSec, WEP, 
WPA, WPA2, etc. On the other hand, new services such as 
telephony over IP and video on demand require quality of 
service guarantees. This QoS could be enabled locally, in 
each domain, by the use of a QoS model such as IntServ and 
DiffServ, and extended to the end-to-end level. Therefore, in 
ubiquitous environments, communication will require both 
QoS and security guarantees which may depend on the used 
access network. In that environment, the challenge is to 
simultaneously provide QoS and security for 
communications of mobile users without compromising this 
mobility. This will allow users to easily change of access 
network for mobility reasons or because a new network, 
better corresponding to their needs, becomes available. One 
solution is to provide mobile users with capabilities of 
dynamic negotiation of a service level including QoS and 
security. In fact, a communication can involve one or more 
domains. So, the mobile user must initiate a service level 
negotiation with the different managers of the implied 
domains in order to establish an agreement on a service level 
that they will undertake to ensure it. 
In this context, we had specified a negotiation protocol 
which allows the dynamic negotiation of a service level 
including simultaneously QoS and security. This negotiation 
protocol is based on the use of the Web Services (WS) 
technologies in order to provide the different negotiation 
parts with interoperability. Thus, the negotiation initiation 
can be easily based on the user profile, which will optimize 
and automate the negotiation process. Since this protocol can 
be used in order to enable service level in ubiquitous 
environments for critical communications, the negotiation 
flow can be attacked by malicious third party. For example, 
these attacks may aim to disable security level needed by the 
communication endpoints. Thus, we think that it is very 
important to secure the negotiation flow especially in 
ubiquitous environments where the negotiation can be 
initiated by mobile users connected via wireless access 
networks.  
In this paper, we present a protocol which enables 
negotiating a service level covering both QoS and security in 
ubiquitous environments. Then, we study and implement the 
security of the negotiation ensured by this protocol. Indeed, 
we secure this protocol at different layers using WSS, SSL 
and IPSec in order to choose the most adapted solution.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow: section 2 
introduces the negotiation of service level before describing 
some results dealing with user profile. In section 3, the 
architecture of a protocol for service level negotiation in 
ubiquitous environments is detailed. Section 4 recalls the 
architecture of Web Services and the main features of the 
different protocols used in securing the negotiation protocol. 
In section 5, the implementation of the negotiation protocol 
is detailed. Section 6 shows test results. The last section 
concludes the paper and points out perspectives of this work. 
2. General context 
In this section, we introduce the service level negotiation. 
Then, we present some results relating to user profiles that 
help us in the definition of the user profile on which the 
negotiation in ubiquitous environments is based.  
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2.1 Negotiation of service level 
The increasing need of QoS, security and mobility requires 
the dynamic negotiation of service level between users and 
service providers. In fact, service offering in IP networks is 
defined through a Service Level Agreement (SLA) which is 
a contract between the service provider and the user. The 
technical parameters of this SLA are grouped together in a 
specification called Service Level Specification (SLS).  
These parameters, defined in Tequila project [1] (only QoS 
parameters), constitute the negotiable part of the contract 
between a service provider and a client and can cover 
various aspects such as QoS, security and mobility. 
To guarantee an end-to-end service level, the managers of 
the different domains implied in a service offer must agree 
on the SLS parameters. Thus, several protocols were 
proposed in order to provide dynamic service level 
negotiation such as QoS-NSLP [2], COPS-SLS [3], QoS-
GSLP [4] and DSNP [5]. Generally, these protocols allow 
negotiation entities to establish a service level, modify or 
terminate it. 
To allow service level negotiation in a self-management 
environment, we have proposed a protocol that we called 
SLNP (Service Level Negotiation Protocol) [6]. In such an 
environment, domain managers use different technologies 
whose integration is increasingly difficult and expensive. To 
overcome this problem, the SLNP protocol provides domain 
managers with interoperability by using Web Services 
technologies.  This interoperability constitutes one of the 
major advantages of this negotiation protocol. Furthermore, 
the negotiated SLS using SLNP is easily extensible to new 
parameters because of its XML based definition. 
Moreover, unlike the protocols mentioned above which 
negotiate only QoS, SLNP is one of a few protocols ([7] and 
[8]) which associates security to QoS to satisfy security 
needs which are increasing with the wide deployment of 
wireless networks. In addition, it allows SLS negotiation in 
ubiquitous environments by basing the definition of the SLS 
to negotiate on the user profile parameters and by 
collaborating with the IEEE 802.21 standard in order to 
provide users’ mobility. 
2.2 User profile 
A user profile is a set of data relating to a user. This notion 
can be used in various contexts. For example the adaptation 
of media stream defined by the MPEG-21 [9] is based on the 
Usage Environment Description (UED) tool which offers 
standardized description of user characteristics and 
environment. This description covers four components: user, 
terminal, network and environment. In this case, the defined 
user profile is quite general, and the contained parameters 
could be very interesting in a service level negotiation 
context. Another example is the user profile defined when 
specifying a “smart” interface that allows users to negotiate 
QoS [10]. In this work, the needed QoS level is defined on 
the basis of application needs and user characteristics. 
However, SLNP combines QoS and security in its 
negotiation. Therefore, other parameters relating to security 
were specified for the SLS negotiation (Section 3.2.1). 
3. A protocol for service level negotiation in 
ubiquitous environments 
In this section we describe the global architecture of SLNP. 
Then, we detail its user profile based functioning that 
provide users with negotiation capability in ubiquitous 
environments. 
 3.1  Global architecture 
SLNP was defined to guarantee an end-to-end service level 
negotiation in a self management environment [6]. In fact, 
the managers of the different domains implied in a service 
offer must agree on a SLS by the exchange of negotiation 
messages (Negotiate, Revision, Modify, Notify, Release and 
Response). These messages enable the establishment, the 
modification and the termination of a service level. Each 
message contains a SLS element specifying the negotiated 
parameters: QoS and security [8] (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. XML Schema for the negotiated SLS 
The negotiation processing ensured by SLNP is the 
following (Figure 2). USER1, which wants to communicate 
with USER2, starts a negotiation by specifying the 
parameters of the desired SLS. This SLS is negotiated with 
the managers of the crossed domains (SE1 and SE2). During 
this negotiation, SLNP messages are exchanged between 
USER1 and SE2 in both directions. These messages are 
generally issued by the negotiation extremities (here. USER1 
and SE2), but they are processed and modified, if necessary, 
by the intermediate entities (here. SE1). In order to process a 
message, an entity must interact with its Resource 
Management Function (RMF) that provides it with 
information on resources availability and requests 
admissibility. When negotiation entities agree on the 
negotiated parameters, SLS is established and recorded in 
SLS registries. After that, the QoS level will be guaranteed 
by configuring the concerned entities (e.g. Edge Routers), 
whereas security services will be offered at the network level 
using IPSec [11] or at the transport layer using TLS [12] or 
DTLS [13]. End-to-end security is configured by 
transmitting security information to the endpoints of the 
communication to secure [8]. Finally, the established SLS 
can be modified or released following USER1 request. The 
security impact on QoS could, in some cases, prevent the 
normal course of a communication. Hence, it is very 
important to consider it when negotiating both these two 
aspects [8]. 
 
 11 
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                           Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2009 
 
Figure 2. Global architecture of SLNP 
To accomplish SLS negotiation, a user must have some 
expertise. On the other hand, in ubiquitous environments, 
SLNP has to manage users’ mobility. Thus, to provide all 
users with negotiation capability in ubiquitous environments, 
negotiation process is based on the user profile and the user 
mobility is managed using the IEEE 802.21 standard [14].  
    3.2  User profile based negotiation 
User profile is used to store information about the 
communication environment: terminal, application, access 
network, and user preferences. This information helps to 
establish a service level and to modify it if needed. In this 
part we detail the selected information constituting the user 
profile on which the negotiation is based. Then, we explain 
how this negotiation can be performed. 
3.2.1 User profile parameters 
The selected information are divided into four types: • User preferences contain three categories: QoS, Security 
and Access network. Regarding QoS, preferences are 
expressed by the desired level: High, Medium or Low. 
For security, user must specify if security is Mandatory, 
Desired or Not-necessary. In the two first cases, this user 
should select the needed services (Authentication, 
Integrity, Confidentiality and No-replay) and the level of 
each service (High, Medium or Low). Regarding access 
networks, user preferences are expressed by selecting a 
criterion for access network choice such as Technology, 
Qos, Security or Cost. Then, user will specify how this 
criterion is used in network choice. • Application characteristics are essentially composed of 
the Name and the Type of the application that provide the 
negotiation layer with information on the minimal needed 
QoS level. Since an application can have its own 
security, Security information must be among these 
parameters. • Terminal capabilities contain parameters such as Screen 
size and Supported codec providing indications on the 
required QoS. Moreover, these capabilities include 
Performance parameters (CPU and Memory) that give 
information about security impact on QoS. They also 
cover Security protocols and Cryptographic algorithms 
which are supported by the terminal which will help on 
defining security parameters to negotiate. • Access network characteristics are composed of: an 
Identifier, an Access technology, a Cost, Qos and 
Security parameters. QoS parameters include Latency, 
Jitter, Bandwidth and Loss-rate. While security 
parameters specify the used Security protocol such as 
WEP, WPA or WPA2 that can secure Wi-Fi networks. 
3.2.2 SLS negotiation based on user profile 
Since it uses Web Services, SLNP operates at the application 
level. Negotiation layer is therefore situated at this level, and 
composed of (Figure 3): Mapping and Negotiation Decision 
Point (MNDP), SLS Generator (SG) and SLNP Entity (SE). 
The MNDP is responsible for choosing access network and 
for making negotiation decisions. These decisions are based 
on user profile parameters and changes that may occur. 
Then, when negotiation process should be started, the 
MNDP provides SG with SLS parameters defined according 
to user profile parameters. These parameters are used by the 
SG in creating the SLS element to negotiate, modify or 
release. Finally, the SE is composed of a client application 
and a negotiation Web Service (WS). The client application 
uses the obtained SLS to create the right message in order to 
start the corresponding process (Establishment, Modification 
or Release) by invoking the negotiation WS of the next 
entity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the negotiation layer 
In the MNDP, the defined QoS level is adjusted taking into 
account security impact. Then, if the access network QoS 
can’t ensure the required QoS, then the negotiation can not 
be started. In this case, if QoS level and/or security level can 
be degraded, then degradation is performed. The type of 
parameters to degrade (QoS, security, or both) depends only 
on the strategies implemented in the MNDP. This 
mechanism provides an internal negotiation, which enables 
avoiding the loss of time that can be caused by rounds of 
negotiations between the mobile user and the rest of the 
network. When a negotiation can be started, the MNDP 
transmits SLS parameters to the SG. Finally, negotiation 
result is returned by the SE to the MNDP that transmits it to 
the user. 
When changes occur on user profile parameters, the entire 
MNDP computations are restarted which can lead to the 
modification of the already established SLS. 
In ubiquitous environments, a user initiating a negotiation 
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can be connected to Internet via a non secured wireless 
access network. Thus, the negotiation flow can be attacked 
by a malicious third party in order to modify the needed 
service level. To overcome this problem, the SLNP signaling 
flow can be protected at different levels. The decision 
concerning this protection (SLNP Negotiation Security 
Decision) can also be taken by the MNDP which transmits it 
to the SE in order to secure the negotiation flow if required 
(Figure 3). This decision is also based on the user profile 
parameters. The security protocols that can be used in 
providing security services for the negotiation flow are 
detailed in the next section.   
4. Security of Web Services 
In this section, we introduce WS architecture and the 
standards on which this technology is based. After that, we 
describe some security protocols that can be used to provide 
WS based applications with security services. 
    4.1  Web Services (WS) technology 
Web Services were designed to standardize exchanges on the 
Internet. Indeed, they allow an application to automatically 
find the needed service. The main characteristic of this 
technology is the interoperability that allows applications 
written in various programming languages (Java, C + +, 
Visual Basic, etc.) and running on various platforms (UNIX, 
Windows, etc.) to use WS to exchange data via Internet. 
4.1.1 WS architecture 
The WS architecture is composed of three elements: a 
service provider, a service requester and a discovery 
mechanism. The provider creates a service and publishes its 
address (URI: Uniform Resource Identifier) in a WS 
directory. Thus, this last can provide the requester with 
information about the desired service (function, URI, etc.). 
This allows the requester to connect to the provider in order 
to acquire the service description and the call format. 
4.1.2 WS standards 
Web Services are based on four standards: SOAP (Simple 
Object Access Protocol), WSDL (Web Service Description 
Language), UDDI (Universal Description Discovery and 
Integration) and XML (eXtensible Markup Language).  
The SOAP protocol defines a set of rules for structuring the 
exchanged messages (Call, Response or Fault). SOAP is 
often associated to HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) 
protocol to achieve request/response exchanges [15].  
The WSDL standard allows describing the composition of a 
WS and how to access it. This includes details required to 
interact with the WS like the protocol to use, the URI, the 
performed operations, and the SOAP messages format [16]. 
To discover and locate a WS, we use a discovery mechanism 
like UDDI directories which contain information about WS. 
This will enable providers to register their services and 
requesters to search and locate the needed services [17]. 
The above-mentioned standards (SOAP, WSDL and UDDI) 
are based on XML. In fact, XML is used to define a 
language which can be used to describe all kinds of data and 
texts like SOAP messages, WSDL descriptions and UDDI 
entries [18].  
    4.2  Security of Web Services 
Securing Web Services consists in providing security 
services (authentication, confidentiality, integrity, etc.) to the 
exchanged messages. This security could be introduced 
between two endpoints at the transport layer (SSL/TLS) or at 
the network level (IPSec). However, these two protocols 
become inappropriate to secure WS based exchanges; 
because these last could involve many entities where each of 
them may need to access some parts of the exchanged 
messages while access to other parts may be prohibited. 
Hence, security standards for WS were specified (Figure 4). 
4.2.1 Web Services Security (WSS) standards 
WS Security (WSS) [19] allows protecting SOAP messages 
with XML Security. Indeed, WSS provides confidentiality 
using XML Encryption and integrity using XML Signature. 
XML Signature [20] provides integrity, authenticity and non 
repudiation by enabling entities to sign an entire XML 
document or some parts of this document. An XML 
signature is an XML document containing information on 
the signing process (algorithm, key, etc.), references to the 
signed parts and the signature value. To process an XML 
signature, the transmitter generates a digest for each 
referenced part before calculating the digital signature value 
using the specified algorithms. Then the signed XML 
message is formed by incorporating the signature value, the 
different digests and information on used algorithms and 
keys. This will allow the recipient to proceed to the 
validation of this signature. 
XML Encryption [21] provides confidentiality by allowing 
the encryption of XML data (document, element or content 
of element). The result of encryption is an XML document 
containing information on the encryption process (algorithm, 
key, etc.) and the encrypted data or references to these data. 
The encryption of XML data requires the selection of an 
algorithm and a key that will be transmitted to the pair. Then 
data are serialized before their encryption using the chosen 
algorithm and key. Finally, the message to transmit is formed 
by adding the encrypted data or reference(s) to these data 
and the information needed by the recipient for the 
decryption. 
 
 
Figure 4. Web Services Security standards 
Relying to these two standards, WSS provides SOAP 
messages with security. Indeed, it uses: XML Signature to 
sign a SOAP message and to transmit the signature, and 
XML Encryption to encrypt this message. WSS transmits 
security information in the headers of SOAP messages, such 
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as keys (encryption and signature) and security tokens 
(Kerberos tickets or X509 certificates) that represent 
identities and can be associated to digital signature in order 
to ensure authentication of the message origin. 
To secure a SOAP message, WSS defines security headers. 
In fact, the header of a SOAP message can contain one or 
more security headers where each of them provides security 
information (signature and/or encryption) on this message to 
a recipient that can be the final or an intermediary recipient. 
To sign one or more elements in a SOAP message, the 
security header, added by the transmitter, must include a 
signature which conforms to that specified by XML 
Signature. The recipient of a SOAP message must proceed to 
the validation of the signature. When validation fails, a Fault 
message can be delivered. Otherwise, the signature is 
validated and a confirmation may be sent to the transmitter 
in the header of the Response message, when this is 
required. 
To encrypt one or more elements of a SOAP message, the 
security header must include references to the encrypted 
elements and information on the used key. Then, each 
element to encrypt is replaced by the equivalent encrypted 
data. The recipient of a SOAP message will identify the 
decryption key and the elements to decrypt. Thereafter, each 
encrypted element will be decrypted. If decryption fails, then 
a Fault message will be sent to the transmitter. Encryption 
and decryption are performed according to XML Encryption.  
4.2.2 Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol 
The TLS protocol [12] provides communication with end-to-
end security (confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non repudiation) at the transport layer. It enables securing 
TCP based applications such as Web Services because it 
must rely on a reliable transport protocol (e.g. TCP). It is 
composed of two sub-layers: the TLS Record Protocol at the 
lower sub-layer, and four protocols (Handshake, Alert, 
Change Cipher Spec and Application Data) at the upper sub-
layer (Figure 5). TLS can be used with several application 
protocols like IMAP, POP3 and HTTP on which WS 
exchanges are based. To be effective, the TLS protocol aims 
at reducing the number of cryptographic parameters to be 
negotiated by the way of two concepts: session and 
connection [12]. 
 
 
Figure 5. TLS protocol architecture 
The record protocol provides security to the higher level 
protocols. Indeed, the integrity of the exchanged messages is 
provided by using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
which is computed with a hash function (SHA or MD5), and 
the confidentiality is ensured by a symmetric encryption 
(RC4, RC2, DES, or AES). At the higher layer, the 
handshake protocol allows the communication endpoints to 
agree on security parameters, to authenticate themselves and 
to exchange keys. The change cipher spec allows changing 
cipher specification by replacing the connection current 
states by some already negotiated pending states. Finally, the 
alert protocol allows an endpoint to detect an error and to 
send an informative message to the other endpoint.  
4.2.3 IP Security (IPSec) protocol 
The IPSec protocol [11] permits protecting the traffic at the 
network level. It employs a Security Association (SA) in 
order to offer security services to the transported traffic. 
IPSec uses two mechanisms: Authentication Header (AH) 
and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). AH [22] 
provides integrity, authentication, and optionally non 
repudiation, whereas ESP [23] offers the same services and 
also confidentiality. Each mechanism supports two modes: 
the transport mode that protects the payload of IP datagram, 
and the tunnel mode where the protection covers the IP 
header. 
An IPSec implementation may use three databases. The 
Security Policy Database (SPD) indicates the policies 
defining the treatment to apply to each traffic (Discard, 
Bypass or Protect), the mechanism, the mode, the options 
and the algorithms to use. The Security Association 
Database (SAD) contains the SA parameters. The Peer 
Authorization Database (PAD) associates the SPD to an SA 
management protocol like Internet Key Exchange (IKE). The 
IPSec processing for an outgoing packet is the following. If 
this packet corresponds to an already created SA, then it is 
treated as indicated by this SA. Otherwise, a research in the 
SPD is carried out (Figure 6). If the result of this research 
indicates a treatment of the type Discard or Bypass, then the 
packet is treated consequently. However, if the required 
treatment is Protect then the mechanism of SA management 
(e.g. IKEv2 [24]) is invoked to create a new SA. 
 
 
Figure 6. IPSec protocol processing 
The security protocols described above can be used to secure 
the WS based negotiation protocol. In the next section, we 
show some implantation details as well as test results. 
5. Implementation of the negotiation protocol 
    5.1  Components of the negotiation layer 
According to its situation in a negotiation process, an entity 
can be initiator, intermediate and/or responder. When an 
entity initiates a negotiation process, it needs a Client 
Application (CA) that allows it to invoke the WS of the next 
entity on the negotiation path. In the case of an intermediate 
or a final entity, the client application will permit to notify an 
 14 
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                           Vol. 1, No. 2, August 2009 
initiator in order to inform it about changes in resources 
availability or about SLS violation. In addition, a negotiation 
entity needs a WS containing different operations (Figure 7) 
that will receive various request messages, treat them and 
return the suitable answer messages. Indeed, an intermediate 
or a final entity is concerned by the negotiation, 
modification, release and response operations, whereas an 
initial entity is concerned by the notification operation. Thus, 
a negotiation entity must contain a negotiation WS and a 
negotiation CA which compose what we called SE (SLNP 
Entity).  
 
 
Figure 7. A WSDL representation of the negotiation WS 
The negotiation WS has been defined through its WSDL 
description represented in Figure 7. This definition covers 
the various operations and the types of input and output 
messages associated to each of these operations. Indeed, the 
structure of each message type has been defined through an 
XML schema using the XSD (XML Schema Definition) 
language [25]-[26]. Since each message contains a SLS that 
specifies the negotiated service level, the generic structure of 
this SLS has also been defined using XSD (Figure 1). 
The negotiation CA is used by the initiator to request the 
establishment or the modification of a service level by taking 
the SLS element as argument. In addition, it enables the SLS 
cancellation by taking its identifier as argument. 
In ubiquitous environment, the negotiation process is 
initiated by the user. Thus, this initial negotiation entity will 
also include a MNDP and a SG which enable defining SLS 
parameters and generating the corresponding SLS element. 
    5.2  Implementation of the negotiation layer 
In our SLNP implementation, we chose to use Tomcat of 
Apache as an application server and Axis as SOAP protocol 
implementation. The treatments included in: the MNDP, the 
SG, the various operations of the negotiation WS and the 
negotiation CA are written in Java programming language. 
This choice is explained by the fact that Tomcat and Axis are 
two open source projects. In addition, we dispose of two 
interesting tools. The first is WSDL2Java that permits to 
generate Java classes from WSDL description and the 
WSSD (Web Services Deployment Descriptor) file that 
facilitates the deployment of WS. The second interesting 
option is the ability to view the exchanged SOAP messages 
between the negotiation entities using SOAP Monitor or 
TCP Monitor. 
In the case of the establishment of a SLS in ubiquitous 
environment, the MNDP is responsible for defining SLS 
parameters on the base of the user profile parameters, when a 
negotiation can be started (Figure 8). Indeed, the included 
treatments are based on the user profile parameters and 
cover: the access network choice, the definition of QoS 
parameters, the definition of security parameters and the 
impact estimation when security services are required, and 
finally the definition of the needed SLS parameters when 
negotiation can be started. Then the SG (SLS Generator) is 
in charge of creating the corresponding SLS element.  
After that, the negotiation CA of the mobile user creates a 
Negotiate message with the already generated SLS. This 
message is used to invoke the negotiation operation of the 
next entity negotiation WS (Figure 9). After that, according 
to the returned message, the mobile user will: record the 
established SLS locally if the requested SLS is accepted 
(Response-Ack), accept or refuse the proposed alternative 
(Revision), or end the negotiation process (Response-Nack). 
The SLS establishment initiated by a mobile user involves all 
the negotiation parts. Indeed, the sent Negotiate message will 
transit through all the intermediate entities and reach the 
final entity using a recursive call to theirs negotiation 
operations. 
To optimize the implementation of the negotiation protocol, 
a negotiation entity must contain a single negotiation 
operation that may be invoked when it is an intermediate or a 
final entity. Thus, the processing of this operation must 
cover both these two use cases (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 8. A general diagram of the MNDP processing 
In the case of an intermediate entity, the received Negotiate 
message is modified according to QoS and security 
information provided by the RMF. Then this message is 
transmitted in the direction of the final entity by calling the 
negotiation operation of the next entity WS. The result of 
this invocation (Response or Revision) will be returned to 
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the caller. When it is a final entity, a decision must be taken 
(accept, reject or propose an alternative) and the 
corresponding message (Response-Ack, Response-Nack or 
Revision) must be returned to the caller in order to transmit 
it to the negotiation initiator. When the SLS is accepted, it is 
recorded locally by each negotiation entity. 
    5.3  Implementation of the negotiation flow security 
The security services that we want to ensure for the SLNP 
negotiation flow can be provided by various security 
protocols at different levels of the TCP/IP protocol stack.  
First, the SOAP messages exchanged during SLS negotiation 
are secured using WSS which operates at the application 
layer. So, we use the WSS4J library that implements the 
WSS specification in the Tomcat-Axis environment. In fact, 
the WSS4J API allows us to define different security 
operations to apply to a SOAP message using handlers 
implemented in Java. These handlers are transparent to the 
WS based negotiation protocol and control the creation and 
the use of secured SOAP requests and responses. The calls to 
these handlers must be placed in the deployment descriptors 
of WSS4J on each negotiation entity to describe the security 
measures to be applied. It is very important to note that an 
initial or a final entity is concerned with one set of security 
properties associated to the negotiation exchange with the 
next or with the previous entity, while an intermediate entity 
is concerned by two sets of security properties: one for the 
negotiation exchange with the previous entity and another 
one for that with the next entity. 
Then, to secure the negotiation flow with SSL/TLS, we 
chose HTTPS because it is easily usable with the Tomcat 
server. 
 
Figure 9. A general diagram of the negotiation CA 
processing 
In fact, we created a connector which allows the application 
server of a negotiation entity to support SSL. This requires 
changing the Tomcat server configuration (server.xml) by 
adding a connector that associates SSL to a port (eg. 8443) 
in order to exchange securely the negotiation messages. 
Then, the URI addresses, allowing each entity to call the 
next one, are modified to enable the negotiation WS 
invocation through the ports secured with SSL. 
 
Finally, we secure the negotiation at the network level by 
configuring IPSec on each entity. To do this, we opted for an 
IPSec implementation situated at the OS kernel. Indeed, on 
each entity, we installed two packages: the ipsec-tools 
package is used to manage the SPD and the SAD, whereas 
the racoon package implements the key management 
protocol IKE which permits establishing SA between 
negotiation entities. Each interaction between two adjacent 
negotiation entities is secured in the two directions using two 
SA. 
 
 
Figure 10. A general diagram of the negotiation operation 
processing 
6. Tests and results 
    6.1  Testbed architecture 
To perform local tests, we use an IBM system equipped with 
a Pentium IV, 2.5 GHZ processor and a 1GB RAM. On this 
system, we configure three negotiation entities. Each entity 
is composed of a negotiation WS deployed on a Tomcat 
server and a negotiation CA. The interactions of each entity 
with its RMF are simulated with a MySQL database. We 
note that for WSS and SSL tests, the three negotiation WS 
can be deployed on the same Tomcat server because each 
one is identified through its URI. Whereas to test IPSec 
security we have to create a virtual system for each entity 
because we need IP addresses to distinguish them and to 
create SA. 
For each implemented security, we visualize the exchanged 
messages to check its good functioning. Then, we conduct a 
set of measurements of the two performances parameters of 
the protocol: the messages size and the negotiation time. 
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    6.2  Test and evaluation of WSS security 
The WSS security impact on SLNP performances is 
measured based on several scenarios that may correspond to 
real needs. The identified five scenarios are represented in 
Table 1. 
Scenario WSS security features 
S0 No security 
S1 Simple authentication (username token and password)  
S2 Strong authentication (encrypted username token and timestamp) 
S3 Strong authentication and integrity (message signature) 
S4 Strong authentication and confidentiality (message encryption) 
S5 Strong authentication, integrity and confidentiality 
Table 1. Various WSS security scenarios 
Tests are conducted for a single round negotiation process 
with well-defined SLS parameters for the request message 
which is presented in Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively in 
the case of a non secured exchange and in the case of a 
secured exchange following the security policy used in S3. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. A SOAP message exchanged in the scenario S0 
 
Figure 12. A SOAP message exchanged in the scenario S3 
The size of the exchanged messages is evaluated using TCP 
Monitor, while the mean negotiation time is measured on a 
sample of 1000 measurements (Table 2). 
 
Scenario Message size (Bytes) Mean negotiation time (ms) 
S0 3749 66 
S1 4427 82 
S2 7300 151 
S3 8710 205 
S4 9235 164 
S5 10623 217 
Table 2. Impact of WSS on the protocol performances 
We note that the size of SOAP messages increases when the 
negotiation exchanges are secured with WSS (Figure 13.a). 
This is explained by the introduction of security headers 
whose size depends on the provided security services and the 
mechanisms put in place. Indeed, a simple authentication 
increases slightly the message size because security header 
contains only the username token. However, the strong 
authentication increases almost twice the size of the same 
message (95%) because the security header includes all the 
information required for the encryption of the username 
token and the timestamp such as algorithms and keys. This 
message size increases by 183% when confidentiality and 
integrity are provided in addition to the strong 
authentication. 
The negotiation time also increases when security is 
provided (Figure 13.b). This is due to security treatments 
performed by the different entities such as encryption, 
decryption, performing signature, validating signature, etc. 
Indeed, a simple authentication increases by 30% the 
negotiation time, while a strong authentication increases by 
180% this time because it requires the encryption of the 
username token and the timestamp elements of the security 
header. 
We note that the periodic peaks that can be observed on the 
curves of the negotiation time measurements (Figure 13.b 
and Figure 13.d) are explained by the memory management 
inside the Java Virtual Machine (the garbage collector). 
 
    6.3  WSS Security Vs SSL and IPSec Securities 
 
In this part we compare the impact of different security 
protocols on the performances of the negotiation protocol.  
To check the SSL security implementation, the exchanged 
messages can be viewed using the debug mode of the 
Tomcat server (SOAP Monitor and TCP Monitor cannot be 
used). Whereas IPSec security can be verified using 
TCPdump. To measure the impact of these two security 
protocol on the SLNP performances, we use the same 
evaluation criteria (i.e. size of the exchanged messages 
and the time spent in the negotiation) under the same 
conditions (same request message, one round 
negotiation, system characteristics, CPU and RAM 
consumption, sample of 1000 measurements, etc.). 
In order to compare performances of WSS, SSL and 
IPSec (Table 3), we test security implementations with 
very close security levels. That means that, with all 
security protocols, we choose very similar algorithms 
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for each security service. 
 
Security 
type 
Security features Impact on performances 
No 
security 
Authentication : Null 
Integrity : Null 
Confidentiality : Null 
Message size: 4560 octets 
Mean negotiation time: 238 ms 
WSS 
Authentication : certificates 
Integrity : SHA1 
Confidentiality : AES-128-CBC 
Message size: 11846 octets 
Mean negotiation time: 457 ms 
SSL 
Authentication : certificates 
Integrity : SHA1 
Confidentiality : AES-128-CBC 
Message size: 4929 octets 
Mean negotiation time: 243 ms 
IPSec 
Authentication : certificates 
Integrity : SHA1 
Confidentiality : AES-128 
Message size: 5040 octets 
Mean negotiation time: 267 ms 
Table 3. Comparative impact of security on performances 
Figure 13.c shows that the size of the exchanged packets 
secured with SSL (4929 bytes) and IPSec (5040 bytes) is 
very close to that of an unsecured packet (4446 bytes), and is 
much less than that measured for a WSS security (11846 
bytes). This can be explained by the fact that the IPSec and 
SSL protocol overheads are less important than those 
introduced by WSS. In addition, IPSec and SSL securities 
require a negotiation phase, during which IPSec associations 
and SSL connections are established, that allows the two 
communication endpoints to configure security parameters 
such as algorithms and keys. Whereas these security 
parameters are usually transmitted or referenced in the 
exchanged messages if WSS is employed. 
Concerning the negotiation time (Figure 13.d), we note that 
time measured for SSL (243 ms) and IPSec (267 ms) secured 
negotiations is also very close to that of an unsecured one 
(238 ms). However, for the same security level, this time is 
equal to 457 ms when security is ensured by WSS. In fact, 
the treatments required for security services (encryption, 
decryption, signature computation, etc.) need more time 
when they are executed at application layer than that when 
they are performed at network or transport level.  
For these tests, the configured IPSec security is characterized 
by the use of the AH mechanism to offer integrity and the 
ESP mechanism to provide confidentiality. In fact, we could 
use ESP in offering these two services, but we opted for this 
configuration because it is more robust. Indeed, the integrity 
offered by ESP has a slightly inferior quality than provided 
using AH, since it takes into account less IP header fields. 
Then, it can be very interesting to measure separately the 
impact of the AH and ESP mechanisms on the performances 
of SLNP. The results show that, for the same integrity level, 
the performances are almost similar. For example, the mean 
time of negotiation secured with IPSec is equal to: 242 ms 
when AH is used and 254 ms when ESP is employed. 
    6.4  Negotiation time in function of entities number 
The above-shown negotiation time mesurements are 
performed using only three entities: initial, intermediate, and 
final. Without security, these measurements show a mean 
negotiation time equal to 66 ms for a single round. Since this 
time will vary in function of the number of the implied 
negotiation entities, we tried to evaluate this time according 
to the number of negotiation entities. We found that time 
spent in negotiation is proportional to the number of 
negotiation entities with a factor of 35.5 (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Evolution of the negotiation time 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have described the architecture and the 
functioning of a negotiation protocol enabling QoS and 
security guaranties for mobile users’ communications in 
ubiquitous environments. Then we have presented some 
protocols which can be used to secure WS based 
applications. These protocols are then used in securing the 
already introduced WS based negotiation protocol (SLNP).  
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Figure 13. Impact of security on the performances of the negotiation protocol 
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After that, these security types were evaluated in terms of 
negotiation performances (size of exchanged messages and 
time spent in a negotiation process).  From these tests, we 
conclude that for equivalent security levels, performance of 
the negotiation protocol secured with SSL or IPSec are 
significantly better than those secured using WSS.  
In fact, one of the main benefits of WSS is the high degree 
provided granularity. Indeed, if we need to secure a SOAP 
message transiting through several Web Services by keeping 
confidential for some of these WS but not for others, WSS is 
the ideal solution; because SSL and IPSec provide end-to-
end security. In the case of SLNP, messages are transmitted 
from one entity to another and there is no need to the 
granularity which can be provided by WSS. Thus, we can 
use quite SSL or IPSec to secure SLNP. The use of WSS 
will be allowed if the negotiation protocol performance is 
not considered or if the use of SSL or IPSec is impossible. 
The results presented in this paper are obtained by 
conducting tests on entities involved in a single negotiation 
(i.e. at a given moment, each negotiation entity has only one 
request to treat). Thus, it would be very interesting, in the 
future, to evaluate the scalability of our negotiation protocol. 
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